The Populist Backlash to Gender Equality in International For a: Analyzing Resistance & Response at the United Nations by Rana, Shruti
Maryland Journal of International Law 
Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 13 
The Populist Backlash to Gender Equality in International For a: 
Analyzing Resistance & Response at the United Nations 
Shruti Rana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shruti Rana, The Populist Backlash to Gender Equality in International For a: Analyzing Resistance & 
Response at the United Nations, 35 Md. J. Int'l L. 156 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol35/iss1/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 




The Populist Backlash to Gender Equality in 
International Fora: Analyzing Resistance & 
Response at the United Nations 
SHRUTI RANA†  
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GROWING GLOBAL BACKLASH TO GENDER 
EQUALITY 
As the most recent wave of populism spreads around the world, a 
striking pattern is emerging. At the same time the populists rising to 
power around the world claim to represent the authentic voice of their 
people, they also evince a deep hostility to at least half of their 
population: women.1 
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 1. See KURT WEYLAND, POPULISM: A POLITICAL-STRATEGIC APPROACH 2-4, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM (Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., 2017), available at DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.2 (discussing how the recent wave of populists relies 
on discourse as a definitional feature of their populism, and that this form of populism “sees 
power emanate from ‘the people’ and channel through a leader who seeks to reach followers 
directly); see also Peter Beinart, The New Authoritarians Are Waging War on Women: Donald 
Trump’s Ideological Cousins Around the World Want to Reverse the Feminist Gains of Recent 
Decades, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.-Feb. 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/authoritarian-sexism-trump-
duterte/576382/ (“. . . besides their hostility to liberal democracy, the right-wing autocrats 
taking power across the world share one big thing, which often goes unrecognized in the U.S.: 
They all want to subordinate women.”). 
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The current leaders of countries as varied as the U.S., Brazil, 
Hungary, and the Philippines have all sought to bolster their power and 
mobilize their followers by exploiting this dichotomy, claiming to 
represent the will of the people while glorifying, if not aiding and 
engaging in, attacks on women and gender equality. Populist leaders 
including Trump, Bolsonaro and Duterte, for example, have expressly 
sought to paint female opponents in violent and sexualized terms while 
dismantling legal and other protections for women.2  In Hungary, the 
government has sought to discredit women’s organizations as 
“‘foreign agents’ threatening national identity” while stripping them of 
state funding, shutting down the government gender equality unit, and 
banning gender studies programs at universities.3 The governments 
and leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Poland have engaged in similar 
rhetoric and responses that decry gender rights as they roll back human 
rights protections and reproductive healthcare in the name of restoring 
national power and prestige.4 
These patterns are being replicated around the world as populist 
leaders in a wide range of countries including Bolivia, Croatia, Italy, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela, similarly invoke the “will of the people” as 
they “promote state projects to enforce heteronormative and 
patriarchal family models, aim to curtail reproductive rights and are 
strongly oppositional to rights of sexual minorities,” while women “are 
referred back to their roles as mothers and reproducers of the nation.”5 
 
 2. See Beinart, supra note 1 (listing examples of these leaders’ rhetoric and actions 
unraveling women’s rights and gender equality protections, including that “Bolsonaro of 
Brazil told a Brazilian congresswoman in 2015, ‘I would not rape you, because you are not 
worthy of it.’ His supporters would chant about feeding dog food to feminists. Duterte of the 
Philippines informed soldiers in 2017 that they could rape up to three Mindanao women with 
impunity. In 2018, he ordered his soldiers to shoot female rebels ‘in the vagina’, because ‘that 
would render them useless’.”). 
 3. Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Across the Globe, A “Serious Backlash Against Women’s 
Rights”: The Rise of Authoritarianism has Catalyzed a Rollback of Gender Violence 
Protections and Support Systems, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/domestic-violence-international.html; see also 
Lauren Kent & Samantha Tapfumaneyl, Hungary’s PM Bans Gender Study at Colleges Saying 
‘People are Born Either Male or Female’, CNN (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/19/europe/hungary-bans-gender-study-at-colleges-
trnd/index.html. 
 4. See Gupta, supra note 3. 
 5. Conny Roggeband and Andrea Krizsan, Democratic Backsliding and Backlash 
Against Women’s Rights: Understanding the Current Challenges for Feminist Politics, Expert 
Paper prepared for the UN Women Expert Group Meeting, Sixty-Fourth Session of the 
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW 64) ‘Beijing + 25: Current Context, Emerging 
Issues and Prospects for Gender Equality and Women’s Rights’, EGM/B+25/BGP.1, New 
York, New York, 25-26 September, 2019, pp. 14-15, available 
at https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw64-2020/preparations/expert-group-
meeting#background-paper. 
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Thus, a closer look at the ways the pattern is playing out globally 
shows that the attacks on gender equality are moving beyond rhetoric 
and symbolic action, as they are translated into state action aimed at 
rolling back rights while promoting a return to a past patriarchal and 
stereotypical social order. Turkey’s President Erdogan, for example, 
stated that equality between men and women is “against nature” and 
that “you cannot put women and men on an equal footing,” while his 
administration pushes legislation aimed at providing impunity for 
perpetrators of sexual exploitation and pressures women to increase 
childbearing.6 Likewise, in Poland, the government has launched 
attacks on reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ organizations, and “Western” 
liberal ideals like gender equality while attempting to ban many forms 
of reproductive healthcare and, recently, launching a campaign to 
encourage its population to “breed like rabbits” and increase their 
family size.7  The great cultural, economic, legal, and other diversity 
between these nations only serves to highlight a key unifying feature 
of their rhetoric and actions—a backlash to gender equality.  
In a number of ways, this widespread backlash to gender equality 
mirrors the threats these populists pose to the global legal order. On 
the international stage, these figures have ushered in an era of retreat 
from global governance and international institutions. The United 
States has sought to withdraw from international agreements and 
frameworks including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris 
Climate Agreement, helped paralyze the WTO appellate body, and 
sought to harden national borders to both people and trade.8 Similarly, 
 
 6. See Maya Oppenheim, ‘Marry-your-rapist’ Bill to be Introduced by Lawmakers in 
Turkey, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-marry-rapist-bill-child-marriage-
a9296681.html. 
 7. See Roggeband, supra note 5, at 10-11, 17-18 (detailing the Polish government attacks 
on feminists, LGBTQ+ organizations, and “Western” liberal ideals); Daniel Boffey, Polish 
Government Widely Condemned Over Morning-After Pill Law: Legislation requiring doctor’s 
appointment is latest attack on women’s rights in Poland and violates shared EU values, says 
MEP, THE INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-marry-rapist-bill-child-marriage-
a9296681.html; see also Poland Urges Citizens to “Breed Like Rabbits” to Counteract Falling 
Birth Rate, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-low-birth-rate-health-ministry-
youtube-advert-rabbits-sex-population-a8045076.html. 
 8. Mark Copelovitch & Jon C.W. Pevehouse, International Organizations in a New Era 
of Populist Nationalism, 14 THE REV. OF INT’L ORGANIZATIONS 169, 170 (2019), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09353-1 (discussing how “[r]ecent economic and 
political developments in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Eurozone have raised 
serious challenges to globalization and the multilateral economic and security institutions that 
have been the bedrock of the liberal international order since World War II” and citing 
President Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the 
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the United Kingdom is in the process of withdrawing from the 
European Union, and has joined a number of European countries in  
working to undermine and dismantle the international refugee 
protection system that was supposed to be a bedrock of the post-World 
War II global order.9 Amidst rising nationalism, populist leaders have 
projected domestic grievances and stratifications onto the global stage, 
framing these withdrawals from the international to the domestic 
sphere as attempts to “reclaim sovereignty from international 
arrangements” and as a backlash to and rejection of “cosmopolitan 
elites” who support both international institutions and globalization.10 
From this perspective, it is unsurprising that the populist attacks 
on women’s rights and gender-based human rights are also beginning 
to transcend domestic politics and enter the international sphere.11 Just 
as the “rise of populist, neo-sovereigntist movements and 
governments”12 is being recognized as a global movement,  the 
 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, attacks on NATO, and push for protectionist 
trade policies and immigration restrictions; citing as European examples Brexit, the refugee 
crisis, and the lingering effects of the financial crises as threatening to re-divide Europe along 
new economic and geopolitical lines). See WTO Appellate Body Going Into Slumber is a 
Serious Setback, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Dec. 24, 2019), 
https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/wto-appellate-body-going-into-slumber-is-a-
serious-setback/1802397/ (noting that on December 11, 2019, the World Trade Organization’s 
Appellate Body (AB) “went into hibernation” as a result of US blocking new appointments, 
and describing this development as “a serious setback for the rules-based multilateral trading 
order” and the rule of law as new appeals would now plunge into a “void.”). 
 9. See Copelovitch and Pevehouse, supra note 8; see also Max Fisher & Amanda Traub, 
Trump Wants to Make it Hard to Get Asylum. Other Countries Feel the Same., N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/europe/trump-asylum.html. 
 10. See Peter G. Danchin, Jeremy Farrall, Jolyon Ford, Shruti Rana, Imogen Saunders and 
Daan Verhoeven, Navigating the Backlash against Global Law and Institutions, 38 AUSTL. 
Y.B. INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2020) (presenting a contextualized and nuanced definition to the 
present backlash). See Copelovitch & Pevehouse, supra note 8, at 170-72; see also Id. at 170 
(discussing calls in Africa to stop participation in the International Criminal Court); see also 
Roggeband, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing how Eastern European countries such as Croatia, 
Hungary and Poland are challenging EU norms and fundamental democratic principles). See 
also Brandon Gorman & Charles Seguin, What Conservatives Get Wrong About 
Cosmopolitans, WASHINGTON POST (July 27, 2019) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/27/what-conservatives-gets-wrong-about-
cosmopolitans/ (citing and analyzing U.S. examples of populist and nationalist rhetoric 
fomenting division by rejecting “an imagined cosmopolitan elite”). See also G. John 
Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order?, 94 INT’L AFFAIRS 7 (2018) (discussing 
attempts to withdraw from the liberal international order in the arenas of trade, international 
law, multilateralism, environment, democracy and human rights by leaders of countries 
including United States, Britain, Hungary, Poland, the Philippines and Turkey). 
 11. See Beinart, supra note 1; see also Roggeband, supra note 5, at 9-10 (discussing links 
between national and transnational attacks on women’s rights). 
 12. Yasmine Ergas, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: The Pushback and Its 
Implications, Expert Paper prepared for the UN Women Expert Group Meeting, Sixty-Fourth 
Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW 64) ‘Beijing + 25: Current Context, 
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“backlash” to women’s rights and gender and other equality norms 
occurring within nations is now also recognized as a global movement  
across as well as within nations.13 Like the larger populist backlash to 
the global legal order, the domestic grievances fueling this backlash 
“sweeping across liberal democracies,” are strikingly uniform across 
nations: governments’ and movements’ “aversion to rights for women 
and LGBTQ+ groups and also the harassment of women and minority 
candidates and officeholders, no matter their political agendas.”14 As 
attacks on equality norms and the institutions that support them grow 
within nations,  spread globally, and then enter the international legal 
arena, it would not be far-fetched to presume that the international fora 
and institutions supporting women’s human rights would suffer a 
similar fate to the international institutions and treaties currently in the 
process of fracturing as noted above. 
However, this essay argues that something different is happening 
in the international arena where the battles over gender equality are 
being fought. The populist backlash to the international legal order and 
the backlash to gender equality are both framed in the same terms, as 
efforts to “reclaim sovereignty” and reject cosmopolitan and liberal 
values. However, in the transnational space and international 
institutions created to support women’s and gender-based human 
rights, populists are taking a strikingly different approach. In contrast 
to what is happening in other international institutions and fora, 
populists are not attempting to withdraw from but rather are 
intensifying their engagement with the transnational forum focused on 
gender equality. While this forum for women’s rights and gender 
equality faces a number of challenges and threats15 and has been 
critiqued in the past for its perceived weaknesses and ineffectiveness,16 
 
Emerging Issues and Prospects for Gender Equality and Women’s Rights’, 
EGM/B+25/BGP.1, New York, New York, 25-26 September, 2019, available 
at https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw64-2020/preparations/expert-group-
meeting#background-paper. 
 13. Jennifer M. Piscopo & Denise M. Walsh, Introduction: Symposium on Backlash and 
the Future of Feminism, 45:2 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 265, 265 
(2019) (“Intensifying right-wing opposition to the feminist project seeks to undo gender 
equality policies and increasingly attacks gender justice advocates, politically active women, 
and the marginalized. … This attention has triggered debate among scholars and practitioners 
about the nature, form, and meaning of those assaults, which we broadly conceptualize as 
backlash.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See generally Roggeband, supra note 5; see also Ergas, supra note 12. 
 16. See Loveday Hodson, Women’s Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW’s Optional 
Protocol, 25:2 THE EURO. J. OF INT’L L. 561, 567 (2014); RATNA KAPUR, GENDER ALTERITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A FISHBOWL 14-15 (Edward Elgar ed., 2018) (critiquing the 
human rights project for its failure to engender its promises of freedom, while acknowledging 
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in response to the populist surge, its institutions and spaces are now 
being reshaped and reconfigured, and in some ways revitalized, albeit 
along polarized lines.  
However, despite the close links between the rise of the new 
populists and the growing global backlash to gender equality, and the 
implications of these developments for democracy and the rule of law, 
this arena and its changing dynamics have received surprisingly little 
attention in the discourse around democratic backsliding, populism 
and authoritarianism.17 
To help address this gap, this essay examines the impact of the 
recent populist wave on the international forum arising around the 
United Nations’ institutions and efforts to promote women’s and 
gender-based human rights. Part II below defines and delineates this 
forum, and its role and position within the global legal order.  Part III 
then discusses how some of the unique and often overlooked features 
of this forum help create its transformative potential for re-imagining 
rights, a goal shared by both advocates for and against gender equality. 
Part IV focuses on the nature of the backlash, resistance and response 
in this transnational space created for the articulation, recognition and 
fulfillment of women’s and gender-based human rights. It argues that 
analyzing the ways that the populist backlash and resistance are 
playing out in this arena can further illuminate how and why the 
current iteration of populism is spreading, as well as point to potential 
responses aimed at supporting the international liberal legal order so 
threatened by this wave.18 Specifically, it untangles one of the 
 
that the human rights terrain should not be abandoned but should be engaged with “precisely 
because it is an arena of power, even while there is a simultaneous need for rights to be actively 
dissociated from the assumption that they can deliver the disenfranchised into lasting 
freedom”). 
 17. Roggeband, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that “there is a striking lack of research into the 
gendered aspects and implication of democratic backsliding”); Piscopo & Walsh, supra note 
13, at 265-66, 276 (2019) (noting that gender backlash has not been fully theorized and that 
while researchers, experts and organizations have begun examining the growing global 
assaults on women and LGBTQ+ groups, issuing a call for more work to be done to develop 
specific understandings of what backlash entails and how to successfully counter it). See 
Hodson, supra note 16, at 561-62 (discussing the institution of the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and noting “In light of concerns 
expressed by feminists about the silencing of women’s voices in international law, one might 
expect the jurisprudence and working methods of the Women’s Committee to be of interest to 
a number and range of scholars; in practice, however, its work has failed to generate a great 
deal of excitement or debate.”). 
 18. See Ikenberry, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that the liberal international order is in 
crisis as trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, the environment, democracy and 
human rights appear to be threatened by the leaders of the United States, Britain, Hungary, 
Poland, the Philippines and Turkey, among others). 
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“puzzles” of nationalism, showing how a movement focused on 
domestic grievances has become a transnational movement, with  
cross-border alliances that mobilize around  traditional views of the 
family and utilize illiberal and authoritarian approaches to their goals. 
With gender equality as well as the international legal order at risk, it 
concludes by calling for deeper examination of the ways that the 
populist backlash to gender equality, and the response and resistance 
to the backlash, are playing out on the international stage,  as well as 
their implications for the global legal order.  
II. THE TRANSNATIONAL SPACE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF WOMEN’S 
AND GENDER-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS 
Women’s and gender equality advocates have a long history of 
international activism and organization that includes, over the last 150 
years, global movements focused on women’s suffrage, labor rights, 
and the attainment of equal legal status in marriage and other areas.19 
Human rights advocacy and international law are also by definition 
diverse and broad fields and can encompass a number of arenas, 
movements, and spheres which overlap with gender equality spaces in 
different ways.20 Within these fields, the United Nations (“UN”) plays 
an important role as an “arena of power” in the human rights terrain 
and the locus of much human rights activity.21 Both the role of the UN 
and the ability of the institutions and spaces surrounding its work to 
achieve meaningful and transformative progress in gender equality and 
human rights have often been contested and are themselves the subject 
of much substantive critique.22 Nevertheless, as a conventional site of 
power and because of the ability UN spaces have to greatly impact 
large numbers of people around the world, it is both potentially 
 
 19. SUSANNE ZWINGEL, TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE CEDAW 
CONVENTION IN CONTEXT 36 (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 2016) (discussing the origins and 
development of international and transnational women’s activism dating back to the 1880s 
and tracing the emergence of women’s organizations with international scope). 
 20. See Hilary Charlesworth, What are Women’s Human Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58-84 (2011); see also Kapur, supra 
note 16, at 13-14. 
 21. Kapur, supra note 16, at 14. 
 22. See, e.g., LAURA J. SHEPHERD, GENDER, UN PEACEBUILDING, AND THE POLITICS OF 
SPACE: LOCATING LEGITIMACY 3-4 (Oxford University Press 2017) (noting that at institutions 
such as the United Nations “even when policy frameworks are espousing better support for 
the meaningful participation of women in peace and security governance, for example, or aim 
to ensure that peace and security governance practices are undertaken with due attention paid 
to the operation of gendered power, the ways in which the constitute concepts are represented 
can often produce unintended and note entirely helpful implementation strategies and/or new 
directions of policy practice.”). 
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transformative and necessary to focus on the UN gender equality 
forum when analyzing the impact of populism on global governance 
and institutions and the role of gender in these developments.23 
For these reasons, this section focuses specifically on defining 
and delineating the global forum for discussing the status of women’s 
and gender rights centered on the United Nations and the international 
human rights treaty focusing on women’s rights and gender equality, 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”). This transnational forum for gender 
equality has arisen around the work of the United Nations Commission 
on the Status of Women (“CSW”), the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (“Committee”), and their civil 
society, individual, and member state participants.24 
The Committee is composed primarily of women and is the body 
of independent experts that monitors the implementation of and 
compliance with CEDAW.25 In addition to reporting procedures under 
the Convention, the Committee also oversees the 1999 Optional 
Protocol to the Convention, which is a tribunal-like mechanism 
operating through an individual communications procedure. Through 
this venue, the Committee has been able to issue decisions and 
recommendations regarding complaints alleging violations of the 
Convention’s rights and provisions.26 
The CSW Commission is “the principal global intergovernmental 
body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and the 
promotion of women,” promoting “women’s rights, documenting the 
reality of women’s lives throughout the world, and shaping global 
standards on gender equality and the empowerment of women.”27  
Pursuant to UN resolution, it also takes a lead role in monitoring the 
implementation of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
 
 23. See id. (calling the United Nations a conventional center of power as well as one which 
feminists may engage with as “critical friends”); see also Kapur, supra note 16, at 14-15 (while 
critiquing the human rights project for its failure to engender its promises of freedom, arguing 
that the human rights terrain should not be abandoned but should be engaged with “precisely 
because it is an arena of power, even while there is a simultaneous need for rights to be actively 
dissociated from the assumption that they can deliver the disenfranchised into lasting 
freedom”). 
 24. Zwingel, supra note 19. 
 25. See United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women”, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx (last visited Jan 22, 2020).   
 26. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 562-64. 
 27. Commission on the Status of Women, UN Women, 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).   
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Action, described as “the key global policy document on gender 
equality.”28 
This forum, narrowly defined as encompassing the above 
institutions, treaties, and instruments, by design and evolution also 
includes both formal and informal spaces for civil society 
participation, that is, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
researchers, and individuals.29 In fact, “that the UN became an 
important global forum for discussing the status of women was not so 
much because of general institutional awareness but because of the 
work of committed advocates coming together in the Commission on 
the Status of Women (CSW)”30 and the robust level of civil society 
participation that marks this space. For example, the CSW holds an 
annual two-week session at UN headquarters in New York where the 
key players in the field of international human rights and gender 
equality, including representatives of UN member states, civil society 
organizations, individuals, and other UN entities, gather to discuss 
progress and gaps in the implementation of gender equality treaties and 
principles, and develop outcome and recommendations.31 
Together, these institutions, organizations and people form a 
unique transnational forum focusing on gender equality that has been 
transformative in its impact on international law and in giving voice to 
the reality of women’s lives worldwide.  More recently, however, it 
has become the locus of intense backlash to women’s rights and gender 
equality. The ways that this backlash is playing out in this forum 
reveals a great deal about the nature of the current populist wave, yet 
has not received the attention it deserves from the scholars, institutions 
and practitioners seeking to understand and counter the backlash and 
democratic backsliding. 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Statement by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women on its Relationship with Non-Governmental Organizations, 45th Session, 2010, 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/NGO.pdf, 
paras. 1-4 (statement issued “to clarify and strengthen the Committee’s Relationship with 
NGOs and to enhance the role of NGOs in the implementation of the Convention by States 
parties at the national level” and setting forth formal and informal roles that NGOs can play 
in the Committee’s activities relating to the promotion and monitoring of the implementation 
of the Women’s Convention (CEDAW), and related mechanisms such as the Optional 
Protocol. The Committee also notes in footnote 1 that it considers “the broad term NGOs [to] 
include[] representatives of civil society, trade unions, women’s grassroots organizations and 
others” and intends the term to be “non-exclusive.”). 
 30. See Zwingel, supra note 19, at 37. 
 31. See Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 27.   
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III. RE-IMAGINING RIGHTS 
This transnational forum has long struggled with dichotomies of 
its own: while it is the pre-eminent international arena for the 
articulation and promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, it 
has simultaneously been marginalized within the United Nations and 
international law systems.32 That is, CEDAW, the key human rights 
treaty for women’s rights and gender equality and “international bill of 
rights for women” has been relegated to the margins of the UN system 
and often seen as ‘outside the concerns’ of mainstream human rights 
institutions.33 Similarly, while CEDAW is described as the “definitive 
international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of 
the human rights of women”, these lofty ideals are “severely clipped” 
in practice.34  CEDAW itself is known as the most heavily reserved or 
excepted treaty by signing states, and compliance by signatory states 
is notoriously poor.35 Indeed, despite often claiming the mantle of 
global leadership in human rights and gender rights, the United States 
has simply refused to ratify the treaty (and remains the only 
industrialized democracy in the world to fail to ratify CEDAW).36 
Not surprisingly, this forum has been the frequent target of 
critiques.  On the one hand, like other human rights institutions and 
fora, it has failed to deliver on the hope  that it could provide “lasting 
freedom” to the marginalized and disenfranchised. On the other hand, 
it is subject to the charge that its impact will be limited by the tendency 
of formal international institutions, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, to “(re)produce ways of understanding bodies and 
behaviours that might be at odds” with the progressive ideals of their 
founders and participants.37 
Nonetheless, this forum has in many ways delivered upon its 
 
 32. Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty 
(CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 268 n. 24 (“Ironically, as Hilary Charlesworth has 
pointed out, the creation within the UN system of special ‘women’s’ institutions to deal with 
women’s human rights has, in effect, ‘created a ghetto for women’s interests. The creation of 
‘women’s’ institutions has mean that ‘mainstream’ human rights bodies and institutions have 
tended to downplay the application of human rights norms to women on the implicit 
assumption that women’s rights are outside their concern’ (citing Hilary Charlesworth, 
Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures for the United Nations, 4 Trans. Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 422, 446 (1994)); see also Hodson, supra note 16, at 564-566 (arguing 
that CEDAW and the Committee are positioned both at the core and periphery of the 
international human rights system). 
 33. See supra note 24 and discussion therein.  
 34. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 562. 
 35. Id. at 562-63. 
 36. See Koh, supra note 32, at 265.   
 37. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 3.  
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transformative potential.38 Participants have seized upon its location as 
“a space that vacillates between the particular and the universal, the 
global and the local, the periphery and the center,” opening up an 
“exciting and creative space for the re-imagining of women’s rights” 
and the possibility of “transcending the limitations of traditional 
international law.”39 
This transnational forum for gender equality, a space whose 
creation was premised on the idea that women were by definition not 
elites, and were often largely excluded from governance or public 
office in their country, has provided a space to hear, amplify and spread 
women’s voices. These voices come from a wide range of regions, 
countries, and perspectives. As Gladys Acosta Vargas, a CEDAW 
Committee member noted in 2015, CEDAW and the Beijing Platform 
for Action: 
created better conditions for the implementation of 
CEDAW as an international norm. The silence of women 
has been broken and we have taken the first step toward 
demanding justice: having a voice. Women have spoken in 
the most diverse scenarios, not only to be heard, but to 
change the status quo, empowered by greater autonomy in 
their lives. Social and feminist movements have helped to 
create a critical public awareness about all forms of 
exclusion. Women’s voices are now qualitatively stronger 
in formal and political public spaces, and in their vibrant 
diversity continue to permeate social and cyber spaces, 
helping to enrich democratic expression.40 
Furthermore, in some cases marginalization has provided the 
opportunity to center or incorporate “counter-hegemonic values” that 
have transcended and reshaped traditional views of human rights.41 
CEDAW itself, for example, in contrast to most core international 
treaties, domestic constitutions or bills of rights “acknowledges 
diversity (for example, in its reference to rural women); it locates 
 
 38. Id. at 268-69 (“a country’s ratification of CEDAW is one of the surest indicators of 
the strength of its commitment to internalize the universal norm of gender equality into its 
domestic laws”); See also Hodson, supra note 16, at 567. 
 39. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 561-62, 565. 
 40. Gladys Acosta Vargas, The CEDAW Committee 20 Years After Beijing: Progress in 
Defense of Women’s Rights and Pending Challenges, U.N. RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT (July 3, 2015), http://www.unrisd.org/beijing+20-acosta. 
 41. Id. at 566 (also discussing how these institutions have “been able to develop women’s 
rights into a body of law that departs from the normative and structural limitations of 
international human rights laws.”). 
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human rights and discrimination within a cultural context; it adopts an 
expansive approach to rights that recognize the equal importance of 
economic, social and cultural rights and development rights; and it 
further recognizes that the empowerment of women necessitates 
structural reform.”42 For example, measures like the formal inclusion 
of civil society and a range of voices speaking on gender equality into 
this space reflect the reality that much work in this space has had to 
come from the “bottom-up” but also that such approaches have been 
transformative in countering the exclusions of mainstream human 
rights discourse.43 
In many ways, then, this Essay argues that this transnational 
forum for women’s rights and gender equality has become a liminal 
space, the third space described by sociologists as the in-between 
spaces, between public and private, global and local, political and 
personal, where groups under siege can breathe, let their full and 
authentic selves show, and ultimately imagine their own liberation.44 
Indeed, as we turn attention to the backlash against gender equality, it 
may be precisely this forum’s “occupation of a liminal space, neither 
fixed at the centre nor wholly peripheral, while leading to considerable 
criticism and doubts about its efficacy from those who are anxious 
about its unstable positioning, [that] might prove to be its very 
strength.”45 It is this strength, and the power it provides to shape 
international and domestic discourses on gender equality for non-state 
as well as state actors, that also makes this forum so compelling to both 
the proponents of gender equality and to those who seek to tear it 
down. 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 567 (citing the view that “building bottom-up 
transformative approaches to human rights—especially from a gender perspective-requires the 
deconstruction and redefinition of several entrenched modes of thinking and practice that 
perpetuate the exclusions of mainstream human rights discourse.”). 
 44. See KerryAnn O’Meara, Meeting to Transgress, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2019/01/24/important-role-third-spaces-play-higher-
education-opinion (discussing the role of third spaces such as women’s groups in education 
and other struggles for marginalized people); Homi Bhabha, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE, at 2 
(Routledge 1994)  (describing third spaces, urging a focus on the moments or processes 
produced in the articulation of cultural differences and stating “[t]hese ‘inbetween’ spaces 
provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate 
new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of 
defining the idea of society itself. It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and 
displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of 
nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.”). 
 45. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 567. 
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IV. BACKLASH AND RESPONSE 
Perhaps because of its very successes, this global forum for 
gender equality has also been a site of backlash to gender equality. As 
noted in Part III above, what happens in this transnational gender 
equality forum is often ignored by mainstream human rights 
discourses, researchers, and actors. However, given the nature of the 
rhetoric and actions of the current populist wave, examining the ways 
that backlash is playing out in this arena is not only important, but also 
helps illuminate critical features of this populist wave. This forum, 
which has proved resilient in the face of these attacks, can also 
illuminate possible responses to combat some of the most destructive 
aspects of the current increasingly populist and authoritarian moment. 
First, to understand the backlash and its implications for 
democracy and the international liberal order, gender should be moved 
to the core of the current attempts to understand the populist wave, 
from its current position at the periphery, much as the UN forum has 
attempted to do.46 There is much support for the claim that the “recent, 
right-wing, populist surge in support of ‘illiberal democracy’” has 
placed gender equality at the core of the movement, as “‘antagonism 
to feminism is both a sentiment at the heart of the Right’s value system 
and a political strategy, a platform for organizing and for recruiting 
massive support.”47 Moreover, the implications of this surge and the 
backlash to gender equality cannot be overstated—as the United 
Nations Human Rights Council has warned, the “corrosion of women’s 
human rights is a litmus test for the human rights standards of the 
whole society” and is intertwined with the democratic deterioration.48 
In fact, the global forum for gender equality has long been the 
locus of political strategy and recruitment for the forces that have 
helped fuel the populist surge (and possibly helped spawn some of 
these strategies and platforms). As has been detailed by scholars, 
practitioners, and the United Nations itself, in the mid-1990s, as the 
gender equality movement achieved significant successes at the 
 
 46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 47. Yasmine Ergas, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: The Pushback and Its 
Implications, Expert Paper prepared for the UN Women Expert Group Meeting, Sixty-Fourth 
Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW 64) ‘Beijing + 25: Current Context, 
Emerging Issues and Prospects for Gender Equality and Women’s Rights’, 
EGM/B+25/BGP.1, New York, New York, 25-26 September, 2019, available 
at https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw64-2020/preparations/expert-group-
meeting#background-paper. 
 48. See Gupta, supra note 3; see also supra note 17 (discussing the links between 
democratic backsliding and attacks on gender equality).  
RANA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/21  1:04 PM 
2020] THE POPULIST BACKLASH TO GENDER EQUALITY 169 
international level, actors opposed to gender equality began organizing 
and mobilizing in response.49  
Notably, at the 1995 Beijing Conference, right-wing non-state 
actors including right-wing populist and nationalist groups, religious 
and conservative governments, men’s rights groups, and groups 
opposed to LGBTQ+ recognition began networking transnationally, 
utilizing the civil society participation mechanisms described in Part 
II, to begin blocking the implementation of smaller gender equality 
measures.50 Emboldened and then fueled by the surge in support of 
these “successes,” this movement grew until a global “alliance 
between a wide range of conservative groups such as fundamentalist 
religious groups, both Christian and Islamic, and states with 
conservative governments that share a particular conservative and 
traditional perspective on gender issues emerged seeking to contest, 
undermine, and present further progress of women’s rights 
internationally.”51 
Importantly, this coalition operated and mobilized at both the 
domestic and international levels and gathered momentum, power, and 
numbers.52 By the 2000s, these forces became both “visible and 
effective” in curbing “debate, research, legislation, and public policy 
challenging gender inequalities and violence or promoting LGBTQ+ 
rights—mobilizing around what became known as “gender 
ideology.”53 These forces have grown significantly in strength, power, 
and organization since then, to the point that their alliance now 
“potentially threatens existing international agreements and 
commitments and may undermine the work of international 
organizations and treaty monitoring bodies.”54 This is precisely what 
has happened as the new right-wing populists surge worldwide.55 
These developments in the gender space shed light on what many 
 
 49. See Roggebund, supra note 5, at 7. 
 50. Id. at 8. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Flavia Biroli, The Crisis of Democracy and the Backlash Against Gender, Expert 
Paper prepared for the UN Women Expert Group Meeting, Sixty-Fourth Session of the 
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW 64) ‘Beijing + 25: Current Context, Emerging 
Issues and Prospects for Gender Equality and Women’s Rights’, EGM/B+25/BGP.1, New 
York, New York, 25-26 September, 2019, at 4-5, available 
at https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw64-2020/preparations/expert-group-
meeting#background-paper. 
 54. See Roggeband, supra note 5, at 7. 
 55. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing the populist retreat from the 
international treaties, institutions, and fora supporting the international liberal order).   
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regard as a “puzzle” of the current populist and nationalist wave—the 
“fundamental irony of this political moment: the globalization of 
nationalism.”56 That is, populist and nationalist regimes, leaders, and 
actors—at the same time that they decry “globalists” and 
“cosmopolitan elites”—are themselves part of a transnational 
movement, a network of globally interconnected groups that 
collaborate with and support one another. While on the surface, it 
appears that the emphasis on nationalism, the hardening of borders, 
and the rejection of “foreigners” would preclude or limit such activity, 
the history of the global forum for gender equality shows otherwise. 
Rather, including gender in the analysis reveals that this neo-
conservative, populist and nationalist wave is not necessarily “defined 
by its content, but by the transnational organization of its actors, their 
capacity to mobilize their citizens based on the supposed corruption of 
the natural sexual order and the reinforcement of an anti-pluralist 
rationality in formal democratic contexts, adding to authoritarian 
tendencies.”57 
Moreover, the actions of this right-wing alliance in the global 
forum for gender equality also reveal more specifically the nature of 
their ties and the substance of their claims. This space has been 
described as “a transnational dialectic space where the actors come 
together to speak the language of modernity.”58 The actors centered on 
attacks on gender, however, come together not speaking the language 
of modernity, and the liberal human rights based order that this 
language represents, but rather they invoke the language of 
authoritarianism and tradition, weaponizing this space to ultimately 
challenge not just gender, but democratic processes and outcomes 
themselves, as democratic processes protecting minorities become 
another threat to be subjugated by the majoritarian “will of the 
people.”59 
In these ways, looking at the global forum for gender equality 
provides us with important context, history and information on the 
nature of the populist and nationalist wave. Significantly, perhaps 
because of the valuable platforms and opportunities for collaboration 
 
 56. Jo Becker, The Global Machine Behind the Rise of Far-Right Nationalism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/europe/sweden-
immigration-nationalism.html; see also Joshua Keating, Dictators Without Borders, 
SLATE.COM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/01/authoritarianism-
democracy-trump-borders.html. 
 57. See Biroli, supra note 53. 
 58. Sally Engle Merry, CREATING HUMAN RIGHTS, at 37-38. 
 59. See Biroli, supra note 53; see also Ergas, supra note 12. 
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that this international forum provides, the populists who are 
withdrawing from other international liberal fora are engaging quite 
deeply in the gender fora. For this reason, we should expect the gender 
fora to remain an important site for analysis as it will likely remain as 
a testing ground for strategic politics and messaging for populists and 
nationalists. 
Ultimately, however, the true value of this global forum might lie 
not in the backlash currently unspooling in this arena, but in the various 
forms of resistance that also grow and take form in this arena, that can 
provide models and strategies for success in resisting the destructive 
elements of the current populist, authoritarian, and nationalist wave. 
As one author noted, “defeating them [populists] requires 
empowering women” but also “requires normalizing their 
empowerment so autocrats can’t turn women leaders and protesters 
into symbols of political perversity. And that requires confronting the 
underlying reason[s] many men—and some women—view women’s 
political power as unnatural.”60 
As this task has long been centered at the core of the global forum 
for gender equality,61 it will serve us well to consider its claims, 
successes, and models with the seriousness they deserve. 
 
 
 60. See Beinart, supra note 1. 
 61. See Hodson, supra note 16, at 567-68. 
